promised to change the political culture of the Southern Cone of the continent, after decades of rivalry and friction. In particular, with all four countries beginning a new period of political democracy after decades of bloody military rule, Mercosul was also, and perhaps mainly, seen as an attempt to strengthen civilian rule and democratic practices in the region, an insurance policy against new adventures.
The political expectation has largely been vindicated. Except for the natural vagaries characteristic of any relationship between nations, political understanding between Mercosul members, and notably between Brazil and argentina, has been sustained, independently of the orientation of the parties eventually in power in each country. Economic promises exhibited a more erratic experience. after a strong beginning, in which trade between members grew quickly, difficulties began to accumulate and to create frictions and irritants that forced the integration process to stall to a crawling pace. Stagnation in Brazil in the 1990s, the succession of crises in argentina since the late 1990s, and the frustration of Uruguay and Paraguay with the limited gains they have had with Mercosul so far have shown the difficulties to move forward after a first stage of "easy" integration. Presently, Mercosul is faced with divisive conflicts between members and, like the European Union, with the dilemmas of enlargement to other countries. No one will admit that the future of the initiative may be in jeopardy, but present difficulties will certainly try the resolve of the creators of Mercosul.
Early perspectives on integration in Latin America
after World War II, economic integration in latin america was strongly defended by economists most usually associated with the then newly created United Nations' Economic Commission for latin america, CEPal (the Portuguese and Spanish acronym). CEPal was the cradle of the structuralist approach to economic development, where a team led by raul Prebisch, from argentina, and including some of the most important economists of the continent, such as Celso Furtado, from Brazil, and the Chilean anibal Pinto, struggled to advance a school of economic thought that would take into explicit consideration the characteristics of the latin american region. CEPalian economics was strongly oriented toward the examination of latin american historical development and the evolution of its institutions, in a framework based on Keynes (whose ideas Prebisch was among the first in the continent to explore and present to the local public) but also on the consideration that supply constraints in developing economies could be more important than is usually recognized in the developed world.
Prebisch and Furtado believed that underdevelopment was in fact to be defined not merely as a state of "backwardness" in comparison with income levels of advanced economies. What defined a country as underdeveloped, they proposed, was the mode through which the country participated in the international economy. More concretely, underdeveloped countries were peripheral to the international economic system, while developed countries occupied its center. This meant that underdeveloped countries not only operated as suppliers of raw materials for central economies, depending thus on the latter for the determination of its dynamic properties, but that the domestic economies were relatively less integrated themselves, since the provision of their own needs, particularly in what referred to manufactured goods, was made by the central countries. There were no industrial complexes in underdeveloped economies. The income circuit went through the central economies, which would buy their raw materials and sell them manufactured final goods. 1 Underdevelopment was, of course, usually associated with povertythat is, with lower per capita incomes-but this was not its central feature. If one wanted to summarize the theory in one word, perhaps the best would be "dependence," rather than poverty. 2 Poverty, however, was not an accidental feature of underdevelopment either. Prebisch vigorously defended the view that specialization in the supply of raw materials and natural commodities to central economies, even if it could be justified in terms of traditional ricardian static comparative advantage theory, was dynamically suboptimal. according to Prebisch, terms of trade tended to evolve adversely to suppliers of natural raw materials and agricultural commodities for two reasons: income elasticity of demand tended to be significantly smaller than unity for those goods, in contrast with the income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods, and technical progress tended to weaken the demand for natural raw materials, through the increased use of synthetic materials. Therefore, even if one could show that, at any given moment, specialization maximizes a country's income, the observation of the process in the long term would show a less and less satisfactory result.
The way out of underdevelopment, in the CEPal view, was to support accelerated industrialization, to change the mode of insertion of the underdeveloped economies, to integrate their own domestic economies, and to resist pauperization because of deteriorating terms of trade. Contrary to myth, Prebisch did not defend autarchy. The key to development was not to close the developing economy but to transform its productive structure, hence the name by which this school of thought became known, structuralism. 3 Industrialization, however, was not equally within reach of all countries in latin america-first, of course, because of the different sizes of the economies in the region, but also because specific past historical evolution constrained the alternatives offered to each of them.
In his influential work on the economies of the region, Furtado distinguished three groups of countries according to their relationship to colonial metropoles first and central economies later. The first group, comprising argentina and Uruguay, specialized in the production of agricultural goods similar to those produced in Europe. The second, including Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru, produced mineral raw materials. The third produced tropical agricultural goods, such as sugar, cocoa, coffee, and other goods in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Central america, and the Caribbean and large areas of Mexico and Venezuela. 4 Only a few of these economies-notably, Brazil-were able to integrate their own economies to some degree, which allowed the latter country to maintain its territorial integrity after independence, in contrast to the fragmentation of hispano-america. In some cases, particularly in the first and third group of countries, some manufacturing activity emerged in support of the export sectors. In any case, in the region as a whole, economies were more integrated to their colonial masters, or, later, to central economies, than to each other or even internally to each one.
The existence of these "holes" in the productive structure of latin american countries meant that demand incentives resulting from an expansion in the production of export goods tended to be reoriented toward the central economies themselves, particularly, according Furtado, in the peripheral economies dedicated to exporting minerals. Therefore, technical progress and increasing productivity tended to remain confined to central countries, beyond the reach of underdeveloped economies, which meant that underdevelopment was in fact a stable state.
This stable state was disturbed, however, by the great depression and World War II. The demand for raw materials and primary commodities fell precipitously during the depression. The supply of imported goods, on the other hand, was disrupted both by the depression and by the decrease in civilian trade during the war. For many countries, thus, an opportunity was created to push industrialization up through import substitution. however, spontaneous import substitution could not do the trick desired by underdeveloped economies: although some manufactures began to be produced by local firms, the economy remained largely fragmented. The main nexus of an integrated economy was supposed to result from the creation of a local capital goods-producing sector industry. Only then would technical progress be internalized and the dynamic fruits of the expansion of demand for final goods be fully captured. This would not happen spontaneously, however, according to CEPal economists. Contrary to the production of consumer goods, particularly nondurable consumer goods, producing capital goods demands the fulfillment of many preconditions, and this required planning and more active intervention by the state.
It was at this point that the concern with integration emerged. In contrast to the production of consumer goods, producing capital goods may involve significant economies of scale, which makes the size of the markets for these goods an essential consideration. Besides, in many cases, one cannot simply install production facilities for some goods without making sure that complementary facilities for related goods are also being created. The value of the minimum required investment and the size of the market for the goods to be produced led both Prebisch and Furtado to stress the need for regional integration and to criticize the timidity of initiatives such as alalC (latin american Free Trade association), which were then being initiated. Simply promoting free trade, which in itself demands a large investment in political negotiations, would not do. Vigorous planning and active industrial policies were necessary to push industrialization in the second stage of import substitution. however, planning and policymaking had to be implemented within a regional perspective because the new sectors would only be viable if a regional, rather than a national, market could be explored. Isolated efforts at national development would not only waste resources by duplicating initiatives, they would fail because of the creation of excess capacity.
CEPal's proposals were not heeded, however. alalC was folded up a few years after its creation without ever making a real impression on the member economies. Some other regional initiatives were either timid in conception or were as bold in rhetoric as they were ineffective in practice. The creation of Mercosul was supposed to break with this pattern.
Mercosul: origins, goals, and dilemmas description
Mercosul was created in 1985 as the initiative of argentina and Brazil, joined later by Paraguay and Uruguay, largely inspired by the experience of the European Union. accordingly, Mercosul was expected to become more than a simple customs union or free trade area. In fact, as will be argued later, integration of productive activities was envisaged since the beginning, particularly between the two leading countries in the group-Brazil and argentina. also as in the case of the European Union, there were high expectations that Mercosul would be able to promote a much deeper political understanding between the member countries, all of which were emerging from military dictatorships of variable duration and degree of political violence.
The four countries had a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.09 trillion in 2005, which is not impressive but could probably allow the creation of markets for a large range of manufactured goods, capital goods included. 5 however, shares in this total are very diverse, which is evidently very unhelpful for the concept of an economic union. Brazil's GDP represented about 80 percent of the region's total ($882 billion), followed by argentina ($183 billion), Uruguay ($16 billion), and Paraguay ($7 billion). Therefore, if one considers the argument about increasing the size of markets to make it viable to explore scale economies as the main rationale for integration, it is easy to see that, except for the argentinean market, Brazil would not have much of an economic incentive to promote integration. levels of development are also diverse. Per capita income ranged from $8,260 in Uruguay in 2008, to $2,180 in Paraguay, with Brazil ($7,350) and argentina ($7,200 ) in between. 6 The four economies are also very different in their productive structures: Brazil and argentina have large 5 See CEPal (2007, p. 294), table a-2 for total GDP in current U.S. dollars. The reader is warned to take these values with some caution. all four members adopt flexible or semiflexible exchange rate regimes. The volatility of the dollar in the region causes dollar measurements to fluctuate, sometimes wildly.
6 Data were taken from the World Bank Web site (http://siteresources.worldbank .org/DaTaSTaTISTICS/resources/GNIPC.pdf). In purchasing power parity terms, the World Bank informs that in 2008, per capita incomes were $14,020 in argentina, and diversified manufacturing sectors, a result of decades of spontaneous and policy-induced growth. Given the large natural resources endowment in the two countries, a high level of self-sufficiency was considered to be feasible and desirable and industrial policies were designed accordingly, particularly in the Brazilian case. as a result, in 2005, even after years of export promotion efforts, exports were still only 13 percent of Brazil's GDP. Exports answered for a larger share of the other member countries demand, 22 percent for argentina, 19 percent for Uruguay, and 43 percent of Paraguay. 7 also notable, the rate of investment has been rather low in the region for quite a while, although it had been accelerating lately, until the subprime crisis hit the region in the last months of 2008. In 2005, investments as a share of GDP were as low as 11 percent in Uruguay. It was 15 percent in Brazil, 16.5 percent in Paraguay, and 17.9 percent in argentina. 8 Capital accumulation was far from satisfactory in every Mercosul member, insufficient to support any serious effort at overcoming the three "lost decades" they had suffered since the 1980s.
a final characteristic of the regional economies to be stressed is the similarity between the economic structures of Brazil and argentina, a point that will be explored below. Uruguay is different given its size and prosperity, and Paraguay, larger but poorer. all this means is that there are two large problems: how to allocate activities between Brazil and argentina, which involves very difficult decisions as to industrial localization, and what economic roles can be given to Uruguay and Paraguay.
Origin
Despite the strength of economic arguments in favor of or against regional integration, one cannot lose sight that it is primarily a political decision to be taken by national states. Technical arguments, and even economic interests, tended to take a back seat in this kind of debate. Not surprisingly, perhaps, defense concerns tend, for instance, to play a much larger role in the decision whether or not to sacrifice a fraction of national sovereignty in favor of a supranational authority. The first successful regional integration of modern times, the creation of the United States, certainly followed this pattern. Despite common misconceptions, the creation of what came to be the European Union also largely resulted from a context marked by the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. 9 Mercosul was born out of political concerns, too, and at least indirectly related to security fears. In this case, it was the long experience with military dictatorships that caused Brazil and argentina to take the lead. Both countries emerged from military regimes more or less at the same time in the early 1980s. These regimes were in power, on and off in the case of argentina, permanently in the Brazilian case, since the mid1960s. Uruguay and argentina lived through a particularly bloody variety of military domination, characterized by mass murders of opponents. Paraguay, in contrast, lived under a decades-old one-man dictatorship when widespread corruption practically destroyed any perspective of economic development for an already backward country, even for the region's standards.
The presidents of argentina, raul alfonsin, and of Brazil, José Sarney, took the initiative of pushing for integration as a kind of regional self-insurance against possible new attempts by the local military to recreate dictatorial regimes. Military regimes typically foment hostility against neighbors as a way of maintaining the population permanently mobilized (even while they collaborate among themselves to persecute their enemies). rivalry and hostility between Brazil and argentina, in particular, had been fed for many years by the nationalistic rhetoric of military dictators. Mercosul, in contrast, was hailed as an effective attempt to substitute political, economic, and cultural contacts between the two countries for the hostility of the recent past. From this point of view, Mercosul can probably be counted as a complete success. 10 as for economic relations, the path to integration has been a little rockier. Trade has expanded between the member countries, particularly between Brazil and argentina in the first years of the Mercosul initiative. 9 a first push for West European integration was made by the United States in the context of the Marshall Plan, intended to accelerate the recovery of war-ravaged countries to serve as a barrier against the expansion of the Soviet Union beyond the boundaries set at the end of World War II. See Behrman (2007) . The motivations of the European countries themselves were more complex but fit in the same pattern. Each of the major partners-France and Germany-had specific motives to join. France had to give up its plans for a permanent occupation of Germany when the United States decided to strengthen the latter, including militarily, to serve as a first instance barrier against the Soviet Union. Germany (and Italy) saw the possibility of upgrading their status of defeated nations, obtaining, as Olivi and Giacone put it, equality of rights with the winners (see Olivi and Giacone, 2007, pp. 20, 25) . 10 With the possible exception of disputes between national soccer teams, still a difficult subject in the area.
Trade with Uruguay and Paraguay has not expanded at comparable rates, leading Uruguay recently to look for alternatives, such as signing a free trade agreement with the United States, which is alleged by argentina and Brazil to violate Mercosul rules. Expanding trade, however, was only one of the objectives that Mercosul was expected to serve. The ambitions of Mercosul's founding fathers went much further than merely increasing intraregional trade. Inspired by the successes of the European Union, Mercosul aspired to start a similar process of integration in the Southern Cone of South america. however, results have not been bright and the immediate future does not look any brighter in this particular.
The difficulties have been more or less the same since the beginning. There are at least three major barriers to be faced by member countries to recover lost momentum. First, there is the problem of reaching a suitable degree of complementariness between the economies of the member countries so as to allow them to reach the scale economies Furtado and Prebisch wrote about. Second, there is the difficulty of harmonizing the interests of a relatively advanced country that is, however, constrained by its very small size, as it is the case of Uruguay. Finally, it is necessary to define a special relationship to the less-developed country in the region-Paraguay-to help it to catch up with the other members.
The problem of complementariness is particularly difficult and it is key to the future of Mercosul. It is a problem mostly for argentina and Brazil, countries of greater size and similar economic structure, result of a similar process of industrialization, which started as an import substitution process. as Prebisch and Furtado emphasized, argentina and Brazil built a manufacturing sector following the same strategy, based at first on import substitution and, later, on the absorption of foreign investment. The supply of domestically produced manufactures was directed at the provision of their own national markets, usually protected by high tariffs and other restrictions on imports (e.g., Prebisch, 1963). higher costs, resulting from monopoly rents allowed by protection and from production inefficiencies caused by the operation at inadequate scales, were absorbed by domestic customers, whose choices in terms of suppliers were limited.
When Brazil and argentina decided to integrate their economies, the problem arose of determining the pattern of specialization that would be followed to serve the new, enlarged market. It is important to note that the manufacturing sectors in both countries developed along the same lines, fed by the same incentives. Promoting specialization would mean deciding which sectors would be dismantled in each economy, a decision fated to face all kinds of political difficulties. "Natural" vocations were initially identifiable only in terms of natural resources (for instance, the provision of dairy products and beef from argentina and of tropical agricultural products from Brazil), and even these differences have been partly neutralized by technical progress in the adaptation of animals and plants to local conditions in each country.
The question of specialization is not simply an irritant. It is actually at the core of economic integration. The lack of a consensus solution to this problem prevents significant advances in the question of tariffs, for instance, which are constantly reopened and turn around mostly the definition of exceptions to common initiatives than planning more efficient modes of production. Developing a common industrial policy to accelerate development is also beyond the possibilities of the present arrangements. Because there are no "natural" vocations involved in this process, the condition for integration to move forward is the willingness of member countries to accept the losses a process of specialization would entail for individual groups, including the determination of which industries should actually be relocated to the more backward members of Mercosul, as it is the case of Paraguay.
The second problem relates to the position of Uruguay. a very small country, with a relatively high standard of life, would probably find its most appropriate role as a political center for Mercosul (which could not be located in Brazil or in argentina) and as a financial center for the region. a political center for Mercosul will not be relevant, however, until the question debated above is solved-that is, until the leading members accept the idea of a supranational authority for the whole region. Until this happens, there will be bureaucratic headquarters for Mercosul, but not political centers, because political initiative will not be conferred to the union itself.
as a financial center, the perspectives for Uruguay are even more limited. Brazil has a very strong domestic financial system and there is no reason to relocate it to another country. The financial system in argentina is highly internationalized, dominated by foreign financial institutions, so that relocation to Uruguay also makes no sense. The country's attempts in the 1980s to become a sort of hong Kong for the region failed because of similar reasons to those just given and there is no perspective that it could be different now. So the advantages of staying in Mercosul are, in fact, doubtful for Uruguay. as a producer of some manufacturing good for the member countries, Uruguay's possibilities are limited by the same difficulty faced by Brazil and argentina, which is the definition of roles in a specialized regional geography. The result-ing disillusionment of Uruguay with the promises of Mercosul are real and difficult to deal with.
Paraguay's position is different because its degree of development does not actually give it many choices. Its gains from remaining a member of Mercosul depend on the leading (and richer) countries defining a "solidarity" policy, in lines similar to those applied in the European Union, in which backward members are "compensated" by the richer countries for their membership. The specialization problem is also manifest in that it is necessary to define some productive sectors that could be developed in the country to supply the region, but allocation of activities would probably have to be supplemented by subsidies at least in the infant industry stage.
Faced with these structural difficulties, which actually put in cause the very rationale of the integration initiative, Mercosul members seem to favor a fuite en avant tactic. In the 1990s, while the question of tariffs seemed completely intractable, then-President Carlos Menem of argentina proposed the adoption of a common currency. 11 More recently, proposals for the enlargement of Mercosul, with the admittance of new members, have been advanced. In fact, Venezuela is in the process of becoming a full member (although the proposal is facing political resistance in some countries because of doubts about the solidity of the adherence to democratic principles by its current government), Bolivia and Chile were admitted as observers, and other countries, such as Ecuador, have been approached about their eventual wish to join the union. The enlargement will not make the tough decisions that have to be made any easier. The question of location of activities will be as dramatic (or more) as they already are, with a larger number of candidates to receive relocated industries. The admission of poorer countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador will increase the pressures for solidarity financing on the richer members, such as Brazil and argentina, which are far from ready to play a similar role to Germany's in the European Union. Finally, the admission of countries ruled by political leaders known by suspicious postures as to basic democratic principles, such as the alternation in power, may erode the one fixed point so far in the Mercosul initiative, which is the preservation of political democracy in the area.
In part, the problem may be the ambition of Mercosul's fathers. Prodded by the European Union example, which is now actually going itself through a difficult period with the enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe, Mercosul was born under the sign of impatience. The gradual and cautious beginning of the European Union, as with the petits pas strategy of Jean Monnet, was ignored in the region, ceding its place to grandiloquent discussions about unattainable integration movements in the short term. 12 Voluntarism blinded political leaders of Mercosul countries and instead of a quick integration process, the countries in the region actually got mired in seemingly insurmountable difficulties. Instead of facing these difficulties, the same leaders seem to have chosen to increase the bets.
Conclusion
Keynes observed once that when one talks about the localization of manufacturing activities, it makes no sense to think in terms of comparative advantage. 13 This is precisely at the heart of the difficulties met by Mercosul to advance in its promised integration between the member economies. One cannot escape the need to look in the face the political problem of defining roles in an integrated regional economy and, which is the hard part, picking up the losers (and arriving at appropriate compensations) that will have to clear the way for the chosen industries to develop elsewhere.
The creation of Mercosul has represented a great step forward given its most immediate objective, to strengthen democracies in the region. a military coup in Paraguay was actually defeated by the firm reaction of the other members that made it clear the new regime would not be recognized. It is doubtful if military initiatives would be as easily detained if they had taken place in countries where the armed forces are stronger, but the fact remains that the countries in the Mercosul area currently enjoy a degree of freedom unknown in their previous history. as it happened in the case of the European Union, which found durable peace after centuries of almost uninterrupted warfare, the biggest gain of Mercosul so far has been in the political area. The difficult economic decisions that have to be made cannot be avoided for too long to avoid risking those gains.
